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LEBRON V. GOTTLIEB AND NONECONOMIC DAMAGES FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY: CLOSING THE DOOR ON CAPS, BUT
OPENING IT TO NEW POSSIBILITIES
JACQUELYN M. HILL*
INTRODUCTION
In May 2005, the Illinois General Assembly succeeded in passing a
new tort reform law aimed at addressing a perceived medical malprac-
tice crisis in the state.1 Officially called "An Act Concerning Insurance,"
Public Act 94-677 ("P.A. 94-677") reformed medical malpractice law by
focusing on legal change, medical discipline, and insurance regula-
tionS.2 One particular reform capped noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice and wrongful death actions.3 Specifically, the statute lim-
ited the total noneconomic damages to $1,000,000 for all plaintiffs in a
case of an award against a hospital and its personnel or hospital affili-
ates.4 In a case of an award against a physician or his business, a cor-
porate entity or personnel, or a health care professional, the cap
limited the total amount of noneconomic damages to $500,000.s
Just one year later, Abigaile Lebron and her mother, Frances
Lebron, filed a medical malpractice action in the Cook County circuit
court against Gottlieb Memorial Hospital and two of its medical per-
sonnel.6 The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of certain acts and omis-
sions by the defendants during and after Abigaile's birth, Abigaile
suffered from severe brain injury, mental impairment, and inability to
develop normal neurological functions.7 Simultaneously, the Lebrons
sought a declaration that the new damage limitations imposed by P.A.
94-677 were unconstitutional.8 On February 4, 2010, the case reached
* juris Doctor Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology,
2012; B.A., American Studies, Illinois Wesleyan University, 2009.
1. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1706.5 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-1496 of the 2010
Reg. Sess.), invalidated by Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'I Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010).
2. Id.
3. Id.at (a) (1).
4. Id.
5. Id. at (a)(2).
6. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 899.
7. Id. at 900.
8. Id.
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the Supreme Court of Illinois. The Court found in favor of the Lebrons,
holding that the cap on noneconomic damages was unconstitutional
because it violated the Illinois Constitution's separation of powers
clause.9
Many other state supreme courts have addressed the constitu-
tionality of statutory caps on noneconomic damages. These courts have
based their decisions on various grounds; some jurisdictions focus on
the special legislation doctrine, others explore challenges based on the
right to a jury trial, a few focus on equal protection, and still others use
a due process analysis.1o The Illinois Supreme Court, however, solely
utilized the remittitur doctrine to come to its conclusion.11
This case comment addresses the Lebron decision and its ra-
tionale, particularly its focus on the remittitur doctrine. Additionally,
this comment addresses the following concepts: 1) the background and
history of attempts to limit common law liability in tort law in Illinois;
2) the remittitur doctrine; 3) other jurisdictions' responses to statuto-
ry caps; 4) the majority's distinctions regarding the General Assembly;
and 5) alternatives to the tort system of medical malpractice liability
which might receive more attention after Lebron.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE HEALTH CARE CRISIS IN ILLINOIS
A. Prior Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis and Subsequent Legisla-
tion
In the years prior to 1975, Illinois underwent a perceived medical
malpractice insurance crisiS.12 In response, the Illinois General Assem-
bly enacted legislation limiting medical malpractice recovery, particu-
larly noneconomic damages.13 The legislation implemented a $500,000
maximum recovery for injuries resulting from "medical, hospital, or
other healing art malpractice."14 One year after the legislation was
passed, Jean Mary Wright brought action in the circuit court of Cook
County against Central Du Page Hospital Association.15
9. Id. at 917.
10. See generally Carolyn Victoria J. Lees, The Inevitable Reevaluation of Best v. Taylor in Light
of Illinois' Health Care Crisis, 25 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 217, 225 (2005).
11. Lebron,930 N.E.2d at 901.
12. Lees, supra note 10, at 224.
13. Id.
14. 73 ILL.REV.STAT. § 401(a) (West 1975), invalidated by Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp.
Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976).
15. Id.
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Wright sought to recover damages from the hospital and some of
its medical personnel for personal injuries suffered while she was con-
fined to the hospital as a patient.16 In the plaintiffs complaint, Wright
challenged multiple provisions of the new legislation, including the cap
on noneconomic damages.17 The case ultimately reached the Illinois
Supreme Court, which found that the $500,000 cap violated the Illinois
Constitution under the equal protection and due process clauses.18
After considering several other provisions of Public Act 79-960,
the Court began its analysis of the fourth section, which limited the
maximum recovery for medical malpractice injuries.19 Wright argued
that by denying recovery for losses in excess of $500,000, the General
Assembly had arbitrarily classified and unreasonably discriminated
against the most seriously injured victims of medical malpractice.20
Citing a previous case that dealt with the Illinois Wrongful Death Act,
the defendants countered that the General Assembly could set limits
on recoveries-even if the result was to deny certain plaintiffs full
compensation for their injurieS.21 The Court rejected the defendants'
arguments, noting that the medical malpractice limitation was distin-
guishable because the action for medical malpractice had a common
law basiS.22 According to the majority, when the legislature creates the
right and the remedy for an action, it has the authority to limit those
remedieS.23 When the right arises from the common law, however, the
General Assembly does not possess the same privilege.24 In addition,
the Court found that the limitation arbitrarily limited recovery in ac-
tions for medical malpractice, thereby granting a special privilege for
certain tortfeasors in violation of the Illinois Constitution.25
B. Best v. Taylor and the Illinois Tort Reform Acts of 1995
Despite the result in Wright, Illinois legislators again attempted to
enact tort reform in the early 1990S.26 In 1995, the legislature signed
16. Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 737.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 744.
19. Id. at 741.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 741-742.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 743.
26. See Lees, supra note 10, at 225.
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into law the Civil Reform Amendments of 1995.27 The legislation cov-
ered several areas of tort law, including products liability, joint and
several liability, jury instructions, and damages.28 The damages provi-
sion, however, remained the biggest source of debate and critique. The
provision introduced a statutory cap for both punitive and noneco-
nomic damages, which the Act defined as "damages which are intangi-
ble, including but not limited to damages for pain and suffering,
disability, disfigurement, loss of consortium, and loss of society."29
Specifically, the noneconomic damages provision limited recovery to
$500,000 per plaintiff in any of the actions listed in the Amendments.30
In Best v. Taylor Machine Works, plaintiff Vernon Best challenged
the constitutionality of the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995.31
Best, after suffering an accident while operating a forklift, brought a
products liability action against the forklift manufacturer and a hy-
draulic fluid manufacturer.32 Best sought noneconomic damages in
excess of $500,000, asserting that he suffered severe and disfiguring
injuries and that he would continue to suffer grievous pain and an-
guish.33 The circuit court consolidated the case with a separate case, in
which the estate of a deceased truck driver brought a negligence suit
against the owner and operator of the train that killed him.34 The Mad-
ison County circuit court found that fifteen specific provisions of the
Civil Justice Reform Amendments were unconstitutional.35
The Illinois Supreme Court, on appeal, focused heavily on the
$500,000 cap on noneconomic damages. The defendants characterized
the Act as "a legitimate reform measure that is within the scope of the
Illinois General Assembly's power to change the common law, shape
public policy, and regulate the state's economic health."36 On the other
side, the plaintiffs argued that the reforms erected arbitrary barriers to
meritorious claims, and that the Act violated several provisions of the
Illinois Constitution: the special legislation clause, the equal protection
and due process clause, the separation of powers clause, the right to
27. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.05(a)-(e) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-1496 of the
2010 Reg. Sess.), invalidated by Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1063 (Ill. 1997).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1062-1063.
32. Id. at 1064.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1065.
36. Id. at 1063.
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jury clause, and the right to a certain remedy.37 After a lengthy analy-
sis, the Court concluded that the Act violated the Illinois Constitution's
special legislation and separation of powers clauses.38
The Court began its analysis of the damages cap by examining the
Illinois Constitution's prohibition on special legislation.39 The specific
clause provides that the General Assembly "shall pass no special or
local law when a general law is or can be made applicable."40 This pro-
vision prohibits the General Assembly from conferring, without a
sound and reasonable basis, a special benefit or privilege on a person
or group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly situated.41 Un-
der this standard, a court must determine whether the state's statutory
classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.42 Apply-
ing this test, the court found that that the statutory cap was irrational
and not legitimately related to the state's proclaimed interest in reduc-
ing the systemic costs of tort liability.43
Next, the court analyzed the plaintiffs argument that the damages
cap violated the Illinois Constitution's separation of powers clause.44
The clause holds that "the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
are separate" and that "no branch shall exercise powers properly be-
longing to another."45 Best argued that the statutory cap "improperly
delegat[ed] to the legislature the power of remitting verdicts and
judgments, which is a power unique to the judiciary."46
Under the remittitur doctrine, the judiciary retains the power, in
limited circumstances, to correct an excessive jury verdict by reducing
a damage award.47 The plaintiff must consent, or the court will order a
new trial.48 Generally, a damage award "will be deemed excessive if it
falls outside the range of fair and reasonable compensation or results
from passion or prejudice."49 The court noted that the practice of or-
37, Id.
38. Id. at 1064, 1106.
39. Id at 1069.
40. ILL. CONsT. of 1970, art. IV, § 13.
41. Petition of the Vill. of Vernon Hills, 658 N.E.2d 365, 367 (111. 1995).
42. Id.
43. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1077. The court cited three types of such irrational discrimination:
discrimination between individuals slightly and severely injured; discrimination among individu-
als with identical injuries; and discrimination among types of injuries. Id
44. Id. at 1078.
45. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. II, § 1.
46. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1078.
47. Id at 1079.
48. Id. at 1080.
49. Id. at 1079.
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dering a remittitur "has long been recognized and accepted as part of
Illinois law" and that it prompts "the administration of justice and the
conclusion of litigation."so The majority concluded that the statutory
cap functioned as a "legislative remittitur" by overriding the jury's
careful deliberative process without regard to the specific circum-
stances of a particular plaintiffs injuries.s1
Critics of the decision in Best attacked the majority's holding on
several grounds. Many argued that the damage caps, rather than acting
as a legislative remittitur, merely set an outer parameter by which
wholly subjective damages would be limited.52 Such opponents assert-
ed that the General Assembly has the right to change or alter the com-
mon law if that change is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.53 To critics, the heightened medical malpractice insurance
crisis constituted such a legitimate state interest.54 Critics also claimed
that Best's holding impaired the legislature's role to evaluate and de-
termine issues of public policy.ss Despite the criticism, however, the
Illinois Supreme Court's holding remained intact for almost a decade.
C A New Cap: Public Act 94-677
In 2004, new legislative efforts to reform tort law emerged. Pro-
ponents of reform argued that medical malpractice litigation greatly
increased the premiums for malpractice insurance and forced many
physicians to leave IllinoiS.56 Critics questioned the extent of the crisis
as well as the effectiveness of damage caps as a means of addressing
the high malpractice insurance premiums.57 Eventually, the Illinois
General Assembly sided with the proponents, passing Public Act 94-
677 on May 23, 2005.s8
Unlike the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, which were
aimed at several areas of tort law, Public Act 94-677 focused only on
medical malpractice law.s9 The Act capped noneconomic damages, but
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1080.
52. Lees, supra note 10, at 231.
53. Id. at 230.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 232.
56. Id.
57. David Goldhaber & David J. Grycz, Illinois Adds Fuel to the Fiery National Healthcare
Debate: Supreme Court Strikes Damage Caps and Other Healthcare Reforms, 22 HEALTH LAw., no. 5,
June 2010 at 19.
58. See id
59. See id.
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did not include any caps for punitive damageS.6o The Act declared that
"in a case of an award against a hospital and its personnel or hospital
affiliates," the total noneconomic damages were limited to $1,000,000
for all plaintiffs in any civil action arising out of the care of the hospital
personnel or affiliateS.61 In a case of an award against a physician or
his business, a corporate entity and personnel, or a health care profes-
sional, the reform limited the total amount of noneconomic damages to
$500,000 for all plaintiffs in any civil action arising out of the care of
such entity.62
The General Assembly cited several reasons and underlying ra-
tionales for passing Public Act 94-677. Among those reasons, the Gen-
eral Assembly listed:
(1) The increasing cost of medical liability insurance results in in-
creased financial burdens on physicians and hospitals.
(2) The increasing cost of medical liability insurance in Illinois is be-
lieved to have contributed to the reduction of the availability of med-
ical care in portions of the State and is believed to have discouraged
some medical students from choosing Illinois as the place they will
receive their medical education and practice medicine.
(3) The public would benefit from making the services of hospitals
and physicians more available.
(4) This health care crisis, which endangers the public health, safety,
and welfare of the citizens of Illinois, requires significant reforms.
P.A. 94-677, Art. 1, § 101.63 Despite the consideration and re-
search that went into Public Act 94-677, the reforms were not destined
to last very long.
II. LEBRON V. GOTTLIEB: THE DEATH OF PUBLIC ACT 94-677
A. Case Background and Amicus Curiae Briefs
In November 2006, plaintiffs Abigaile Lebron and her mother,
Frances Lebron, filed a medical malpractice and declaratory judgment
60. See id
61. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1706.5(a)(1).
62. Id. at (a)(2). This amount, $500,000, was the same amount of the cap for noneconomic
damages that was listed in the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-1115.05(a)-(e). Other provisions of the Act included: a law elevating standards for experts;
an extension for "Good Samaritan" immunity for physicians providing free care; and a rule which
permitted doctors and hospitals to apologize to patients and their families, and prohibited that
apology from being admitted during trial as an admission of liability. Additionally, the Act provid-
ed Illinois officials with greater abilities to discipline physicians and amended several portions of
the Illinois Insurance Code for medical liability insurers. Id.
63. Id.
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action in the Cook County circuit court against Gottlieb Memorial Hos-
pital and some of its personnel.64 The Lebrons alleged that Abigaile
sustained numerous permanent injuries during her birth at the hospi-
tal, including severe brain injury, cerebral palsy, cognitive mental im-
pairment, and the inability to be fed normally.65 The Lebrons sought a
judicial determination of their rights with respect to Public Act 94-677,
as well as a declaration that certain provisions of the Act violated the
Illinois Constitution.66 Citing Best, the Lebrons argued that the limita-
tion on noneconomic damages violated the separation of powers
clause.67
Before the case reached the Illinois Supreme Court, several parties
filed amicus curiae briefs. The Illinois Hospital Association and other
hospital associations filed a brief on behalf of the defendants on May
20, 2009.68 The hospital associations first argued that P.A. 94-677 rep-
resented the Illinois legislature's "careful and constitutional solution to
a problem with which nearly every state legislature in the nation has
grappled: preserving access to health care in the face of skyrocketing
medical liability costs."69 The hospital associations feared that if the
Act were overturned, "unchecked medical liability costs will undoubt-
edly begin their rapid climb to the disadvantage of all Illinoisans," and
that all members of the public would pay the price for this decision.70
The hospital associations' brief also maintained that the recovery
of noneconomic damages is not "so important that the legislature is
constitutionally prevented from imposing generous limitations on
the ... liability of hospitals and physicians."71 In their view, the alterna-
tive position would place the court directly into the role of the legisla-
ture-a role for which the court lacks policy-making standards and
resourceS.72 The associations additionally argued that assessing of the
impact of medical liability costs is a legislative task, and that "it is not
the role of the judiciary to declare that there is a better way to address
64. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 899.
65. Id. at 900.
66. Id.
67. Id. In particular, they believed that Abigaile's damages for her injuries would greatly
exceed the $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages. Id.
68. Brief for Ill. Hosp. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant, Lebron v.
Gottlieb Mem'1 Hosp. at 3, 930 N.W.2d 895 (ll. 2010) (Nos. 105741, 105745).
69. Id. at 3.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 5.
72. Id
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the problem."73 Finally, the hospital associations declared that the trial
court erred by placing the interests of the plaintiffs over the interests
of the public in general.74
On the opposite side of the spectrum, the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) and the Illinois AFL-CIO wrote briefs in support of the
plaintiffs. According to the ABA, caps on noneconomic damages "dis-
courage lawyers from taking meritorious cases where economic dam-
ages are low, and thus, undermine the ability of a significant number of
injured persons to seek redress in the courts."7s The ABA argued that
instead of imposing a ceiling on pain and suffering damages, trial and
appellate courts should make greater use of the power of remittitur or
additur.76 They also declared that the caps "discriminate against the
relatively small number of accident victims who suffer the most devas-
tating physical and psychological injuries."77
The Illinois AFL-CIO and the Chicago Federation of Labor, in their
brief, focused on the arbitrariness of the cap itself, claiming that "the
Legislature picked a number out of a hat."78 The AFL-CIO also believed
that the Act constituted special legislation by conferring a benefit on
one group of persons but denying that benefit to others who are simi-
larly situated.79
B. The Court's Rationale: Remittitur and Best
Finally, in February 2010, the Illinois Supreme Court reached a
decision. The court relied heavily on Best, concluding that P.A. 94-677
infringed upon the inherent power of the judiciary to order a remit-
titur, thereby violating the Illinois Constitution's separation of powers
clause.8o The circuit court had previously determined that the statuto-
ry cap operated as a legislative remittitur and focused only on that
argument.81 Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court considered only a
73. Id.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Brief for Am. Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees, Lebron v.
Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp. at 1, 930 N.W.2d 895 (Ill. 2010) (Nos. 105741, 105745).
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Brief for Ill. AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees, Lebron v. Gottlieb
Mem'1 Hosp. at 7, 930 N.W.2d 895 (1ll. 2010) (Nos. 105741, 105745). The ABA found that the
primary impact of damage caps falls on cases involving women, children, and the elderly, espe-
cially in death cases involving those groups. Id.
79. Id. at 3-4.
80. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 917.
81. Id.at901.
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separation of powers challenge without inquiring into any of the plain-
tiffs' other argument.82
First, the court rejected the defendants' argument that P.A. 94-667
was distinguishable from the statute at issue in Best.83 The Civil Justice
Reform Amendments of 1995, at the heart of the problem in Best, cov-
ered "all common law, statutory or other actions that seek damages on
account of death, bodily injury, or physical damage to property based
on negligence, or product liability."84 P.A. 94-677 was limited to "any
medical malpractice action or wrongful death action based on medical
malpractice."85 The court restated, however, that the purpose of the
separation of powers clause is to "ensure that the whole power of two
or more branches of government shall not reside in the same hands."86
Thus, the legislature "is prohibited from enacting laws that unduly
infringe upon the inherent powers of judges."87 The Lebron court con-
cluded that although the scope of the statute at issue in Best was much
broader than Public Act 94-677, "the encroachment on the inherent
power of the judiciary is the same."88
The Lebron court found fault with Public Act 94-677 primarily be-
cause it capped noneconomic damages without regard to the particular
facts and circumstances of a case.89 Under the Act, a court "is required
to override the judiciary's deliberative process and reduce any none-
conomic damages in excess of the statutory cap, irrespective of the
particular facts and circumstances, and without the plaintiffs con-
sent."o This process "unduly encroaches upon the fundamentally judi-
cial prerogative of determining whether a jury's assessment of
damages is excessive within the meaning of the law."91 Whereas the
court must carefully examine the particular circumstances of a case
when utilizing a remittitur, no such deliberative process occurs when
applying a damages cap.92 In addition, a plaintiff traditionally must
82. Id. Based on the Act's inseverability provision, the circuit court had invalidated the act in
its entirety. Id.
83. Id at 907-908.
84. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-11 15.05(a)-(e).
85. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1706.5(a).
86. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 905 (quoting Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1057).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 908.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1057).
92. Id.
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either consent to the remittitur or accept a new trial, but the damage
cap from Public Act 94-677 applied unconditionally.93
Next, the court addressed the defendants' arguments regarding
the authority of the Illinois General Assembly. The defendants declared
that since the General Assembly has the right to alter the common law,
Public Act 94-677 represented a valid exercise of that power.94 To
support their argument, the defendants cited previous decisions which
upheld statutes limiting a plaintiffs damages.95 In Unzicker v. Kraft
Food Ingredients Corp., for example, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected
a separation of powers challenge to a provision of the Illinois Code
which modified the common law rule of joint and several liability.96
The majority, however, held that the statute in Unzicker "required the
court to enter judgment in conformity with the jury's assessment of
fault where the defendant was minimally responsible."97 The statute in
Lebron, on the other hand, "require[d] the court to enter a judgment at
variance with the jury's determination and without regard to the
court's duty to consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether the jury's
verdict is excessive as a matter of law."98
The court also distinguished caps on punitive damages from caps
on noneconomic damages. The defendants argued that since the Illi-
nois Supreme Court had previously upheld statutory limits on punitive
damages, the cap on noneconomic damages in P.A. 94-677 was valid.99
Specifically, the defendants cited Siegall v. Solomon and Smith v. Hill,
two cases which dealt with the constitutionality of a cap on punitive
damages.1oo In Smith, the court rejected a separation of powers chal-
lenge to a ban on punitive damages for breach of promise to marry.lol
However, the majority distinguished Smith by declaring that "a ban on
punitive damages is not akin to a cap on noneconomic damages" be-
cause punitive damages are awarded in the interest of society and not
to recompose solely an individual.102
93. Id.
94. Id. at 912.
95. Id. Defendants also relied upon Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763 (lll. 1986); Siegall v.
Solomon, 166. N.E.2d 5 (Ill. 1960); and Smith v. Hill, 147 N.E.2d 321 (Ill. 1958). In the court's
analysis, it distinguished all three cases from Public Act 94-677 because all three dealt with puni-
tive damages, rather than noneconomic damages. Id.
96. Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024, 1043 (Ill. 2002).
97. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 911.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 912.
100. See Siegall v. Solomon, 166. N.E.2d 5 (Ill.1960); Smith v. Hill, 147 N.E.2d 321 (Ill. 1958).
101. Smith, 147 N.E.2d at 327.
102. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 912.
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The defendants also argued that if Section 2-1706.5 of the Act (the
cap on noneconomic damages) was invalidated, other statutes limiting
common law liability could not survive.103 Among others, the defend-
ants mentioned the Good Samaritan Act, the Innkeeper Protection Act,
the Emergency Medical Services Systems Act, and the Probation Com-
munity Service Act.104 The court refused to comment on the constitu-
tionality of such legislation, but noted that none of the statutes cited
"reduce[s] a jury's award of noneconomic damages to a predetermined
limit, irrespective of the facts of the case."los The court also declined to
comment on other similar legislation in other jurisdictions, but sniped
that" 'everybody is doing it' is hardly a litmus test for the constitution-
ality of the statute."106
C. Dissent: An Attack on Remittitur, Best, and the Lack of Deference to
the General Assembly
In his dissent, Justice Karmeier gave a lengthy opinion in which he
questioned several aspects of the majority's rationale.107 Karmeier
argued that the malpractice reforms like P.A. 94-677 might have a "sal-
utary effect" on the perceived national medical malpractice crisis.108
He also declared that public policy determinations are better left to the
legislature, and that the court should grant deference to these deter-
minations.109 Karmeier then argued that the General Assembly had
made progress in tailoring P.A. 94-677 since its last attempt at tort
reform, and that this difference rendered the majority's reliance on the
Best holding inappropriate.11o The substantive bulk of Justice
Karmeier's argument, however, criticized the Best decision itself as
well as the doctrine of remittitur.iii
103. Id.at913.
104. Id. All of these statutes limit common law liability in various fields, including negligence
liability for health care professionals, liability for hotels, and liability for emergency providers of
medical services. See infra, footnotes 216-229.
105. Id.
106. Id. The court did note that the statutes cited by defendants from other states varied
widely, "not only in the amount of the cap, but in other specifics." It also declared that "although
decisions from other jurisdictions can provide guidance... we do not write today on a blank slate.
Our decision in Best guides our analysis." Id.
107. Id. at 917-922.
108. Id.at917.
109, Id. at 920.
110. Id.at927.
111. Id.at927-931.
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Justice Karmeier noted that Best's holding-that legislative caps
on noneconomic damages offends the separation of powers clause-
rests entirely on the idea that caps are a legislative remittitur.112 The
remittitur, he argued, is "not a power specifically vested in the courts
by our constitution or the Constitution of the United States."113 The
majority had not explicitly addressed the constitutionality of remit-
titur, but merely stated that "the application of [the] doctrine has been
a traditional and inherent power of the judicial branch."114 Justice
Karmeier, on the other hand, declared that the remittitur doctrine has
been challenged as unconstitutional as an abridgement of the right to
trial by jury.1i5 He also argued that the remittitur "cannot, in any
meaningful way, be viewed as an essential component of the judicial
power vested in those courts by the Illinois Constitution of 1970."116
According to Karmeier, when the legislature imposes a damages
cap, it is not the equivalent of a legislative remittitur; a court that re-
duces the jury award to comply with the cap is simply implementing a
legislative policy decision to reduce the amount recoverable to one
that the legislature finds reasonable.117 He claimed that the cap is
simply "a determination that a higher award is not permitted as a mat-
ter of law" and is "not a remittitur at all."118 Karmeier also argued that
the cap was constitutional because the General Assembly is fully em-
powered to alter common law remedies.119 In addition, Karmeier not-
ed that the General Assembly has the authority to simply eliminate all
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases.120 If the majority
refused to accept a cap, he argued, this drastic measure might become
reality and "for those committed to insuring that victims of medical
malpractice receive the maximum possible compensation for their
injuries, these loom as sobering possibilities."121
112. Id.at927.
113. Id. at 927-928.
114. Id. at 905.
115. Id. at 928. He cites to the case of Dimick v. Scheidt, which questioned the doctrine's con-
stitutionality. 293 U.S. 474, 484 (1935).
116. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 928.
117. Id. (quoting Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares, 270 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1277-78 (D. Kan. 2003)).
118. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 928.
119. Id. at 931.
120. Id. at 933.
121. Id.
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Finally, Justice Karmeier criticized the majority's quick disregard
of similar caps and cases from other jurisdiction.122 He critiqued the
majority's attempts to create "obstacles" to legitimate efforts by the
legislature to find an answer to what the legislature deems a serious
problem in the health care industry.123 If the courts exceed their con-
stitutional role, he posited, "they not only jeopardize the system of
checks and balances" but they also "put at risk the welfare of the peo-
ple the government was created to serve."124
III. LEBRON AND REM ITTITUR: A SOLID RATIONALE?
Lebron's majority based its decision primarily on the concept of
the remittitur.125 Some authorities, both before the court's decision
and after, have questioned the constitutionality of the doctrine.126
Nonetheless, many states have upheld the doctrine of remittitur, and
some have even used it to strike down statutory caps on noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice actions. This section addresses the
history of the remittitur doctrine, examines decisions of other states
regarding the constitutionality of statutory caps, and briefly looks into
some of the problems and criticisms associated with the remittitur
doctrine.
A. History of Remittitur
The remittitur doctrine was first recognized in the United States in
a case called Blunt v. Little.127 In the opinion, Justice Story stated a
court could order a new trial if damages were excessive as a result of
gross error on the part of the jury.128 Justice Story, citing two English
cases, declared that "if it should clearly appear that the jury have
committed a gross error, or have acted from improper motives, or have
given damages excessive in relation to the person or the injury, it is as
122. Id. at 932. He wrote, "In the matter before us, no one is suggesting that our view of the
separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution be predicated on anything other than the
intent of those who framed and adopted the Constitution. The preeminence of that intent, howev-
er, does not preclude reference to how other courts have analyzed similar provisions under
similar circumstances." Id.
123. Id.at934.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 910-917.
126. See Suja A. Thomas, Re-examining the Constitutionality of the Remittitur under the Seventh
Amendment, OHIO ST. L. J. 731, 750-760 (2003).
127. 3 F. Cas. 760 (D. Mass. 1822).
128. Id. at 762.
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much the duty of the court to interfere, to prevent the wrong, as in any
other case."129
Since this decision, both federal and state courts have recognized
the practice of remittitur. In 1886, the United States Supreme Court
officially recognized the remittitur in Northern Pacific R.R. v. Herbert,
where it upheld a lower court's order that the plaintiff, an injured
brakeman, remit a portion of his damage award or to consent to a new
trial.13o The court, however, failed to provide a rationale for its holding,
merely citing to Blunt and a few other cases.131
Dimick v. Scheidt, a Supreme Court case from 1935, finally shed
some substantive light on the remittitur doctrine.132 In Dimick, the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an additur, an in-
crease of a jury verdict, in the context of the Seventh Amendment's
right to a trial by jury.133 Specifically, the Court's analysis dealt with
the re-examination clause, or the clause which provides that "no fact
tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of common law."134 The court de-
clared that a practice was constitutional under a re-examination clause
of the Seventh Amendment if it existed at the time the amendment was
adopted.13s Thus, the court looked to whether the practice existed at
English common law in 1791.136
In its analysis, the Supreme Court found no evidence of additur,
but noted that federal courts since Blunt had frequently utilized the
remittitur doctrine to decrease jury verdict.137 The Court was able to
cite to a few English common law cases in support of the remittitur,
but, finding no precedent for the additur, declared it unconstitution-
al.138 In dicta, the Court suggested that courts in the future should not
revisit the constitutionality of remittitur.139 The Court conceded, how-
129. Id. Justice Story then ordered that the case be submitted to another jury unless the plain-
tiff would remit $500 of his damages. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
133. Id. at 475.
134. Id. at 476 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIl).
135. Id The Seventh Amendment was adopted in 1791.
136. Id
137. Id. at 476-488. The court looked at the remittitur as a sort of companion to additur to
determine the additur's constitutionality. The defendants had argued that if remittitur was consti-
tutional, the additur should be found constitutional as well. Id.
138. Id. at 486-487.
139. Id.at484-485.
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ever, that "if the question of remittitur were now before us for the first
time, it would be decided otherwise."140
B. State Court Decisions Regarding Statutory Caps on Noneconomic
Damages
Many other states have addressed the constitutionality of caps on
noneconomic damages. Plaintiffs have attacked statutory caps on a
variety of bases, including violations of the following provisions of a
state's constitution: the prohibition against special legislation, the
equal protection clause, the guarantee to a trial by jury, the due pro-
cess clause, and the separation of powers analysis.141 The state su-
preme court decisions generally vary widely, but no other state court
has relied exclusively on the remittitur doctrine in the same manner as
the Lebron majority. This section analyzes and compares a few state
decisions which have addressed the constitutionality of statutory caps
on noneconomic damages.
1. States Upholding Statutory Caps on Damages
One recent case that dealt with statutory caps on noneconomic
damages, and came to the opposite conclusion of Lebron, is Gourley v.
Gourley, a Nebraska case decided in 2003.142 The statute at issue in
Gourley was the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act, which pro-
vided that the total amount recoverable from all health care providers
in a medical malpractice action could not exceed $1,250,000.143 The
Nebraska Supreme Court found that the statutory cap did not consti-
tute special legislation in violation of the state constitution, did not
violate principles of equal protection, did not violate the open courts or
right to trial by jury provision, and did not act as a legislative remit-
titur.144
The Gourley court, in contrast to the Lebron majority, advocated
the idea of legislative deference and explicitly rejected the idea that the
Act constituted a legislative remittitur.145 "It is not this court's place,"
the majority held, "to second-guess the Legislature's reasoning behind
140. Id. at 485.
141. See Matthew M. Light, Who's the Boss?: Statutory Damage Caps, Courts, and State Constitu-
tional Law, 58 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 315, 318-320 (2001).
142. 265 Neb. 918 (Neb. 2003).
143. Id. at 937 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2801 et seq. (1998)). Section 44-2825 of the Act is
discussed in this section.
144. Id.at957.
145. Id. at 956.
[Vol 87:2652
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
passing the act."146 The court noted that the Legislature may abolish a
common-law right or remedy, and stated that a cap therefore does not
act as a legislative judgment of damages.147 The court explicitly reject-
ed the rationale in Best, declaring that "the cap does not ask the Legis-
lature to review a specific dispute and determine the amount of dam-
damages."148 Instead, the majority believed that "the cap imposes a
limit on recovery in all medical malpractice cases as a matter of legisla-
tive policy."149
Another state decision regarding the constitutionality of statutory
caps is Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson.iso The Ohio statute at issue in
Arbino, R.C. 2315.18, held that a court must limit recovery for noneco-
nomic damages at $250,000 or at three times the economic damages
determined by the jury.1s The Arbino majority upheld the statute and,
like the court in Gourley, deferred heavily to legislative judgment.152
The majority rejected Arbino's separation of powers challenge, but did
not mention or address the doctrine of remittitur.153 The court did
hold, however, that the separation of powers argument "lack[ed] mer-
it" because the judicial function of deciding facts in a case "is not so
exclusive as to prohibit the General Assembly from regulating the
amount of damages available in certain circumstances."154
In the Alaska case of Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, the Alaska Su-
preme Court upheld a statutory cap on noneconomic damages for per-
sonal injury cases.iss The plaintiffs had argued that the legislature, by
enacting the cap, usurped the power of the judiciary to remit excessive
damages.156 The Alaska Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs' argument,
146. Id. at 943.
147. Id. at 956. The court also cited to several decisions from other states (such as Kirkland v.
Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464, 471 (Idaho 2000)). It explicitly rejected the Best
decision and noted that it was the only court to hold that a cap on damages improperly delegates
to the legislature the power to remit verdicts and judgments. Id. at 955.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 468 (Ohio 2007).
151. Id. at 474 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.18 (B)(2) (West, through 2010 File 58 of
the 128th GA (2009-2010) )). The statute does not apply to tort actions in the Court of Claims or
to actions for wrongful death, medical or dental malpractice. Id The statute also provided that
these limits did not apply if the plaintiff suffered permanent physical deformity, loss of the use of
a limb or a bodily organ, or permanent physical injury that prevented him from being able to care
for himself independently. Id.
152. Id. at 491.
153. Id. at 483-484.
154. Id. at 483.
155. 56 P.3d 1046, 1070 (Alaska 2002).
156. Id at 1055.
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declaring that "the damage caps cannot violate the separation of pow-
ers, because the caps do not constitute a form of remittitur."157 The
court stated that the legislature has the power to modify or alter the
common law, and that this power includes the ability to set reasonable
limits on recoverable damages.158
2. States Striking Down Statutory Caps as Unconstitutional
Other state decisions, like Lebron, have struck down caps on non-
economic damages for medical malpractice actions. However, none of
these states have exclusively relied upon the remittitur doctrine to
overturn the cap in the same manner as the Lebron majority. More
commonly, plaintiffs attack statutory caps on violations of right to trial
by jury or on equal protection grounds. A recent case in Georgia, Atlan-
ta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, for example, held that a stat-
ute limiting awards of noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
cases violated the right to a jury trial.159
The relevant Georgia statute provided that in an action for medi-
cal malpractice, the total amount recoverable for noneconomic damag-
es was limited to $350,000, regardless of the number of defendant.160
The Court noted that the amount of damages sustained by a plaintiff is
ordinarily an issue of fact, and the right to a jury trial thus includes the
right to have a jury determine the amount of damages.161 The majority
held that "by requiring the court to reduce a noneconomic damages
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1055-1056. The following decisions have adopted a similar rationale in regards to
the remittitur and the separation of powers analysis: Polland v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 213
F.3d 933, 945-46 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 532 U.S. 843 (2001) (holding that feder-
al Title VII damages cap did not violate separation of powers because Congress created the reme-
dies under Title VII, and may therefore limit them as well); Kirkland v. Blaine County Med. Ctr., 4
P.3d 1115, 1121-22 (Idaho 2000) (holding that noneconomic damages cap did not violate separa-
tion of powers because Idaho Constitution grants the legislature the power to modify or abolish
common law causes of action); Edmonds v. Murphy, 325 Md. 342 (Md. 1992) (holding that none-
conomic damages cap did not violate separation of powers because the legislature has the power
to provide for or repeal remedies); Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc. 509
S.E.2d 307, 319 (Va. 1999) (holding that medical malpractice damages cap did not violate separa-
tion of powers, because under Virginia law the legislature "has the power to provide, modify, or
repeal a remedy"); Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406, 411 (W. Va. 2001) (holding that medical
malpractice damages cap did not violate separation of powers because, under West Virginia law,
the legislature has the power to alter the common law, and damages cap is mere limitation of
common law remedies).
159. 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010).
160. Id. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1(c)) (West, through 2010 Reg. Sess.)). The Act also
limited noneconomic damage awards against a single medical facility to $350,000 , and limited
awards to $1,050,000 for actions against multiple health care providers and medical facilities. Id.
at (c), (d), (e).
161. Id. at 222.
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award determined by the jury that exceeds the statutory limit," the Act
"clearly nullifies the jury's findings of fact regarding damages and
thereby undermines the jury's basic function."162
In Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n., the Alabama Supreme Court
struck down a statutory cap on noneconomic damages and briefly
mentioned remittitur, but only in the context of the right to trial by
jury.163 The Court held that the statute setting a $400,000 limit on
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases violated the right
to trial by jury and the equal protection guarantees under the Alabama
Constitution.164 The Court briefly reviewed remittitur as it had been
used in Alabama history, and stated that "the court has often cautioned
against interference with a jury's damages assessment unless the par-
ticular assessment is flawed by bias, passion, prejudice, corruption, or
other improper motive."165 It continued that "the soundness of a jury's
findings on the issue of damages must be evaluated on a case by case
basis."166
The court then held that the right to trial by jury does cover the
right to have a jury make a factual assessment of damageS.167 The Ala-
bama statute violated this right, because when a jury's assessment
exceeds the predesignated ceiling, it "allows no consideration for exi-
gencies presented by each case."168 According to the majority, "such a
requirement has no parallel in the jurisprudence of [Alabama] and is
patently inconsistent with the doctrines of remittitur or new trial."169
Thus, although the Court discussed the remittitur doctrine, it was not
used as grounds for ruling the caps unconstitutional-as it was in
Lebron.
162. Id at 223.
163. 592 So.2d 156, 171 (Ala. 1991)
164. Id.
165. Id. at 161. The defendant had argued that the legislative cap on damages impaired the
right to a jury trial no more than traditional forms of judicial supervision, such as the remittitur.
The court, however, noted that the remittitur actually does implicate a plaintiffs right to trial by
jury. However, the doctrine is permitted because the court only issues remittitur if the verdict is
so excessive or inadequate to indicate that it was produced by passion or prejudice or improper
motive. Id
166. Id. at 162.
167. Id at 163.
168. Id. at 163.
169. Id.
2012]1 655
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
C Problems with Remittitur
Despite the Lebron majority's reliance on the remittitur, some
sources question the doctrine's constitutionality. Since Dimick, the
Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled one way or another on the con-
stitutionality of the remittitur. Some criticize the Dimick decision itself,
arguing that under the English common law prior to 1791, the remit-
titur was not used in the same way that the doctrine is utilized now
(which indicates that the remittitur is unconstitutional under a Sev-
enth Amendment analysis).17o The Lebron majority accepted the remit-
titur doctrine based simply on its continued and uncontested existence
in Illinois.171 Justice Karmeier, on the other hand, attacked the remit-
titur doctrine and directly questioned its constitutionality.172 Although
it seems that the remittitur will remain intact in Illinois, other states
have spent more time grappling with the doctrine's constitutionality.
Some critics have attacked the constitutionality of the remittitur
in the context of a plaintiffs right to a trial by jury. For example, a
judge ordering the remittitur decides the maximum amount that a jury
could have found, and his decision on the matter cannot be ap-
pealed.173 The plaintiff must either accept the remittitur or consent to
a new trial, and if the plaintiff accepts the remittitur he loses the right
to appeal the issue.174 At the next trial, the plaintiff will presumably
put on the same evidence, and the plaintiff must assume that a judge
will reduce damages again if he receives a higher amount than the re-
mittitur. 175 Critics argue that this process effectively destroys a plain-
tiffs right to have damages determined by a jury.176
170. Thomas, supra note 126, at 750-760. Thomas argues that at English common law in
1791, the plaintiff proactively used remittitur to cure a defect in the record, rather than being
forced to agree to a remittitur instigated by the judiciary. She also notes that English courts could
not reduce verdicts with the consent of only one party, and that courts did not state the maximum
sum that a jury could find. Those that did use the remittitur only did so if the damages were
generally calculable, such as in a contracts case. The courts never used remittitur for a case that
had an uncertain damages determination, such as a torts case. In sum, she argues, the federal
courts today practice a remittitur that did not have a English common law analogue in 1791. In
her view of seventh amendment analysis, this makes the doctrine unconstitutional. Id.
171. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 910-915.
172. Id. at 928.
173. See Thomas, supra note 126, at 739-741. The plaintiff cannot appeal this decision, be-
cause it is a final judgment
174. Id.
175. Id. Thomas notes that it will be the same judge deciding the second trial, and that judge
has already determined that the remitted amount was the maximum under the facts. She believes
that a judge will automatically remit the damages if the jury returns a higher amount, or else that
judge would have to admit that his previous ruling on the same facts was incorrect. Id.
176. Id.
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One state which had previously abolished the remittitur doctrine
has since readopted it by statute. In Firestone v. Crown Development
Corp., the Missouri Supreme Court explicitly abolished the remittitur
doctrine, holding that the practice of remittitur was not a provision of
any statute or rule in the state.177 The court also claimed that since the
doctrine's inception, courts questioned remittitur as an invasion of a
party's right to trial by jury and as an assumption of a power to weigh
the evidence-a function reserved to the trier of fact.178 The court
abolished the remittitur, noting that a Missouri court could still order a
new trial for "good cause" or on the grounds that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence.179 However, the Missouri legisla-
ture reinstated the remittitur by statute just two years after Firestone,
and the Missouri legislature declined to address any of the Supreme
Court's arguments from the case.18o
IV. LEBRON'S RELIANCE ON REMITTITUR: LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE
The Lebron majority analyzed the statutory caps on noneconomic
damages solely in the context of the separation of powers clause.181
Although courts such as Gourley also discuss the remittitur in relation
to statutory caps,182 no other state court has exclusively relied upon it
to strike down tort reform legislation. Lebron's decision indicates that
the Illinois Supreme Court will not budge on the issue of statutory caps
on noneconomic damages for causes of action that were created by the
common law. This section makes the following conclusions: 1) the
Lebron Court made a sound decision in light of its remittitur analysis;
2) most of the currently enacted Illinois statutes limiting common law
liability will survive a separation of powers challenge; and 3) after
Lebron, the General Assembly might delve into other methods of re-
177. 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
178. Id.
179. Id. The court then affirmed the verdict of the jury and ordered that the verdict of
$15,000,000 be re-instated for the plaintiff. Id.
180. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.068 (West through end of 2010 First Extraordinary Sess. of the
95th Gen. Assembly). The Missouri legislature enacted its remittitur statute on July 1, 1987. The
statute provides that "a court may enter a remittitur order if after reviewing the evidence in
support of the jury's verdict, the court finds that the jury's verdict is excessive because the
amount of the verdict exceeds a fair and reasonable compensation for plaintiffs injuries and
damages." Id.
181. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 911-917. As noted in this comment, the Lebrons brought several
other arguments regarding the caps but the court declined to address these arguments, since the
lower court focused only on the remittitur.
182. 265 Neb. 918, 955 (Neb. 2003).
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forming medical malpractice liability that do not implicate the remit-
titur-particularly those involving contract law.
A. Why the Majority "Got it Right": Distinctions Regarding the Power
of the General Assembly
1. Authority of the General Assembly: Caps vs. Abolishing Causes of
Action
The Lebron majority correctly concluded that although the Gen-
eral Assembly has the authority to change or alter the common law by
abolishing a cause of action, it may not place a cap on noneconomic
damages.183 When the General Assembly eliminates a cause of action
entirely, the legislature does not interfere with the powers of the judi-
cial branch. For example, if a potential plaintiff cannot bring a cause of
action for noneconomic damages, a jury would never make a determi-
nation of noneconomic damages. The remittitur doctrine, then, could
never be implicated; there would be no damage award, let alone an
excessive award, that the judge could reduce. Thus, although the elimi-
nation of a cause of action might implicate other constitutional issues,
it would pass a separation of powers challenge.
Critics of Lebron argue that instituting a damage cap is no differ-
ent from abolishing a certain cause of action, because a cap simply
eliminates a cause of action for a verdict past a certain number.184 JUS-
tice Karmeier, for example, believes that "reduction of an award to
comport with legal limits does not involve a substitution of the court's
judgment for that of the jury, but rather is a determination that a high-
er award is not permitted as a matter of law."18s This assertion, how-
ever, makes little sense in light of the remittitur analysis.
In the first scenario, when the General Assembly eliminates a
cause of action, a jury never makes a damages determination. With a
statutory damage cap, on the other hand, a jury still determines an
amount of damages. If the jury's determination exceeds a certain num-
ber ($500,000 under the statute in Lebron), the court must automati-
cally reduce it to the set value of the statutory cap. A judge thereby
loses the ability to examine the particular facts of the case to determine
whether the award was actually excessive as a matter of law.186 Con-
183. Lebron,930 N.E.2d at 911-917.
184. See id. at 930-931.
185. Id.at928.
186. See id. at 908.
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sequently, as the majority correctly pointed out, the cap does infringe
upon the judiciary's right to remit an excessive damage award.
The majority also accurately distinguished the case of Unzicker,
which dealt with altering the rules of joint and several liability.187 In
Unzicker, the General Assembly changed the previous rule of joint and
several liability so that if the jury found a tortfeasor less than twenty-
five percent liable, that tortfeasor would be severally liable only for
that percent of the damage. 188 The changes, as the Lebron majority
correctly stated, were not the equivalent of a numeric cap. 189 A cap
requires that the court enter a judgment that "disagrees" with the ju-
ry's determination of damages (because the jury's award automatically
gets reduced, regardless of the facts of the case, if it surpasses a certain
number).19o The altered rule of joint and several liability, on the other
hand, still allows for a case-by-case analysis of "how liable" each de-
fendant is. A jury, and not the legislature, makes the initial determina-
tion of a defendant's percentage of fault and the damage award will
essentially match what the jury finds.
In addition, the changed rule at issue in Unzicker did not substan-
tially affect the judiciary's right to order remittitur. The statute in
Unzicker required the court to enter judgment in conformity with the
jury's assessment of fault when the defendant was minimally respon-
sible (less than twenty-five percent).191 The jury's verdict in such a
case will not be excessive, because the jury has to first determine that a
tortfeasor is less than twenty five percent liable for the total amount of
damages in order for the change to occur. In that sense, the court's
right to remit the amount of damages (when that number is grossly
excessive) will not be infringed. If the jury finds a tortfeasor more than
twenty-five percent liable for the total amount of damages, the tortfea-
sor may then be liable for the full amount, but the court can still remit
the verdict if it becomes excessive. The Lebron majority, then, properly
concluded that Public Act 94-677 was distinct from the statute in
Unzicker.
187. Id. at 910-911.
188. See id. at 910. Before the change, regardless of "how liable" the fact finder found a tort-
feasor to be, a plaintiff could receive all of his damages from that defendant. See id.
189. Id.at911.
190. See id.
191. Id.at911.
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2. Caps: Punitive Damages vs. Noneconomic Damages
The Lebron majority properly distinguished between capping
noneconomic damages and capping punitive damages.192 Part of this
distinction reflects the difference between rights that the General As-
sembly has created and rights that have existed at the common law.
The General Assembly may limit the maximum recovery for rights they
have created.193 The Illinois Supreme Court noted in Wright that when
the legislature creates both the right and the remedy (as in the Wrong-
ful Death Act), the legislature's power to limit the maximum recovery
in the action that it created cannot be questioned.194 In many causes of
action that cap punitive damages, the legislature created, by statute,
the right to recover. The right to recover for injuries arising from med-
ical malpractice, on the other hand, existed at the common law.195 Con-
sequently, the legislature lacks the same authority to limit certain
remedies for medical malpractice actions.
According to the Illinois Supreme Court, plaintiffs have no vested
right to exemplary, punitive, vindictive or aggravated damages.196 As
the Lebron majority correctly noted, punitive damages are not given to
recompense the individual (like noneconomic damages).197 Rather, the
legislature and the Illinois Supreme Court allow recovery of punitive
damages in the interest of society.198 More generally, punitive damages
are often available for willful or intentional violations of a common law
or statutory duty.199 A court grants punitive damages to deter future
misconduct or wrongdoing rather than to compensate the individual
for actual wrong or damage that he suffered.200 Acts that bar punitive
damages, then, "merely establish a 'public policy' that in the interest of
society in the particular class of cases such damages should not be
awarded."201
192. Id. at 912.
193. See Smith, 147 N.E.2d at 325.
194. Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 742.
195. Id.
196. See Smith, 147 N.E.2d at 325.
197. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 912 (quoting Smith, 347 N.E.2d at 326-327).
198. Id.
199. See generally Majorie A. Shields, Construction and Application of State Statutory Cap on
Punitive Damages in Tort Cases Exclusive of Medical Malpractice Actions, 8. A.L.R. 6th 439 (2005)
(summarizing the basic theories of exemplary, punitive or vindictive damages).
200. Id. See also 15 ILL. LAW AND PRAc. DAMAGES § 56 (discussing the purposes for awarding
punitive damages). For more information regarding caps on punitive damage awards, see also
103 A.L.R. 5th 379 (originally published in 2002) (discussing the validity of state statutory caps
on punitive damages).
201. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 912, (quoting Smith, 147 N.E.2d at 326-327).
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As a result, the legislature may restrict or deny the allowance of
punitive damages.202 In pragmatic terms, a jury may, in certain circum-
stances, "punish" the wrongdoer with punitive damages, but the in-
jured plaintiff is not entitled to those damages in the same way the
plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages.203 As the Illinois Su-
preme Court stated in Smith, denying punitive damages "cannot be said
to deny any constitutional right or to encroach upon any judicial func-
tion" (such as the remittitur).204 The fact that punitive damages are not
tied to the severity of a plaintiffs injury, but rather to the culpability of
the defendant's conduct, indicates that a state can cap them. The Court
in Lebron, by striking down the cap on noneconomic damages, simply
complied with its own precedent.
B. Lebron's Implications for the Future: the Innkeeper Protection Act,
Contractual "Loopholes," and Alternative Solutions to Statutory Caps
1. Current Statutes Limiting Common Law Liability in Illinois
Illinois currently has several other statutes that limit common law
liability. In Lebron, the defendants voiced their concern that these stat-
utes could no longer survive if the court struck down Public Act 94-
677.205 The majority did not thoroughly address these arguments,
merely stating that "none of the statutes defendants cite requires a
court to reduce a jury's award of noneconomic damages to a prede-
termined limit, irrespective of the facts of the case."206 However, an
examination of such statutes reveals most of these enactments are safe
from the kind of attack faced by Public Act 94-677.
Most of these statutes, as the Lebron majority pointed out, do not
set numeric limits or caps for causes of action. The Good Samaritan Act,
for example, exempts persons who give emergency telephone instruc-
tions from civil liability altogether, but does not set a cap.207 Similarly,
the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act declares that any
persons, agencies, or governmental bodies that provide emergency
202. Id.
203. See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rector, 104 Ill. 296, 303-304 (111. 1882).
204. Smith, 147 N.E.2d at 327.
205. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 913.
206. Id.
207. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 49/5 (West through P.A. 96-1382 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.). Also
known as the "Good Samaritan Act."
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services in good faith shall not be civilly liable as a result of their acts
unless such acts constitute willful and wanton misconduct.208
A third Act mentioned by the Lebron defendants, the Probation
Community Service Act, eliminates negligence liability for organiza-
tions and individuals who agree to accept community service from
offenders.2o9 All of these statutes, then, simply eliminate certain causes
of action completely rather than setting statutory damage limitations.
Since the Illinois Supreme Court has differentiated between eliminat-
ing causes of action and setting statutory caps, these statutes appear to
be "safe" from a separation of powers analysis; they do not interfere
with the judicial right to remit excessive verdicts.210
One statute mentioned by the Lebron defendants that might be
subject to scrutiny is the Innkeeper Protection Act.211 The Act limits a
hotel's liability for loss or damage to guest property.212 If a hotel pro-
vides a safe or vault for valuables and provides notice to the guests
that the vault exists, and if those guests fail to use the vault for their
valuables, the hotel will not be liable for more than $250 in loss or
damage to guests' property.213 The statute also provides that this limit
applies "regardless of whether such loss or damage is occasioned by
theft, the fault or negligence of such proprietor or manager or of his
agents."214 The Act further states that if the guests do utilize the vault
or safe for valuables, the hotel shall not be liable for more than $500
for loss or damage to the guest's property.21s The final sentence of the
Act, however, provides that the proprietor or manager of the hotel may
enter into a "special agreement" in writing with the guest where the
manager agrees to assume additional liability.216
208. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/3.150 (West through P.A. 96-1382 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.).
Also known as the "Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act."
209. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/1 (West through P.A. 96-1382 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.). Also
known as the "Probation Community Service Act."
210. This scope of this comment is limited to a potential separation of powers challenge to
such statutes. The statutes limiting common law liability may nonetheless be subject to any of the
following challenges (which were brought up in both Best and Lebron): equal protection, due
process, right to trial by jury, and right to certain remedy.
211. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/1 (West through P.A. 96-1382 of the 2010 Reg. Sess). Also
known as the "Innkeeper Protection Act."
212. Id.
213. Id. The Act states that the liability in such a case-when the hotel provides notice of the
vault and the guest does not use it-is limited to liability that results from negligence or fault of
the proprietor or manager. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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The Innkeeper Protection Act raised heated debate even before
the Lebron case made it to the Illinois Supreme Court. The defendants
previously argued that the Innkeeper Protection Act embodied proof
that the General Assembly may limit common law liability with capS.217
The Lebron majority disagreed, stating that the Innkeeper Protection
Act does not parallel P. A. 94-677 because the last provision of the Inn-
keeper Protection Act allows parties to contract around the statutory
limit.218 While it is true that the Innkeeper Protection Act provides for
such a "special agreement," the Act still sets statutory limits on liabil-
ity.219 Unlike the other statutes, which abolish causes of action alto-
gether, the statutory cap in the Innkeeper Protection Act could affect
the judiciary's power to remit.
The Lebron majority seemingly overlooked the fact that the cause
of action against a hotel or "innkeeper" was not created by the General
Assembly, like actions for Worker's Compensation. As such, the Gen-
eral Assembly does not possess the same power to limit the damages
to be awarded; the General Assembly lacks unquestionable authority
to limit remedies for causes of action established by the common
law.220 In addition, the cap in the Innkeeper Protection Act deals with
compensatory damages, rather than punitive damages. Thus, the Gen-
eral Assembly cannot necessarily place a cap on the damage award and
avoid constitutional scrutiny, because plaintiffs have a right to com-
pensatory damageS.221
The ability to contract around the statutory limit, then, may fail to
save the Innkeeper Protection Act from judicial scrutiny, or at least
from a separation of powers challenge. The numeric cap can still pre-
vent the judiciary from remitting an excessive damage award given to
the plaintiff in such a case. For example, imagine a scenario where a
hotel guest foregoes the "special agreement" and presents his valua-
bles to the hotel proprietor for placement in the vault. The hotel man-
agement then acts negligently and loses the valuables. Under the
statute, the plaintiff in an ensuing lawsuit can recover only an amount
up to $500.222 Therefore, if the jury determines that the hotel is liable
217. Brief of Defendants-Appellants Gottlieb Mem'I Hosp. at 4-6, 930 N.W.2d 895 (Ill. 2010)
(Nos. 105741, 105745).
218. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 913.
219. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/1.
220. See Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 912. See also Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 741-742.
221. Id.
222. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/1. This cap limits only the amount recoverable from the
hotel itself.
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for any amount over $500, the judiciary has lost the ability to remit
that award. Instead, the award automatically gets reduced to comply
with the statute. If, on the other hand, the ability to contract around the
statutory limit indicates that the legislature has not infringed upon the
judiciary's sphere of authority in enacting the statute, this "contractual
loophole" may stir up other theories about how to reform medical
malpractice liability.
2. Contracting out of Liability: A Feasible Alternative to Statutory
Caps?
The "special agreement" provision of the Innkeeper Protection Act
allows the individual and the hotel proprietor or manager to contract
around the statutory cap so that the hotel manager agrees to assume
additional liability.223 The Illinois Supreme Court has never addressed
the constitutionality of the Innkeeper Protection Act. If the Act remains
intact, the idea of a contractual loophole may present a viable option
for those desiring medical malpractice liability reform. The theory of
contracting out of medical malpractice liability is not new; both consti-
tutional and tort law scholars have proposed ideas as extreme as re-
placing the tort-based medical malpractice liability system with one
based on contract law.224 However, even a brief exploration of this idea
reveals that certain issues that might arise in its implementation.225
Richard Epstein is one of many prominent scholars who have ad-
vocated a conversion to contract-based liability for medical malprac-
tice.226 When it comes to reforming liability, Epstein believes that "the
key error is to treat this as a tort problem when designing a govern-
ance regime calls for a contractual response."227 He theorizes that a
tort liability system makes sense when the plaintiff and defendant are
strangers, because the tort system adopts a high standard of care in
order to deter the harms one person causes another.228 When physical
injuries arise out of a consensual arrangement between a patient and a
223. Id
224. See generally Jennifer Arlen, Contracting over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the Cost
of Choice, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 957 (2010).
225. This section of the comment focuses solely on the feasibility of adapting the current tort
system to one based on, or implementing, contract law. This comment in no way concludes as to
whether this type of system would be preferable to the one currently enacted.
226. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Contractual Principle versus Legislative Fixes: Coming to
Closure on the Unending Travails of Medical Malpractice, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 503 (2005).
227. Id.at505.
228. Id at 506.
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doctor, however, the traditional system of tort liability is an imperfect
match.229
For Epstein, the objectives of the individuals in the medical mal-
practice context are too different from the basic tort context; the goal
of a patient "is not to keep a supplier or physician at bay" but rather "to
maximize the joint gains from trade through the delivery and receipt of
goods and services."230 In the medical malpractice context, Epstein
would prefer a contract-based system, where physicians are liable only
to parties that have contracted for liability.231 Essentially, patients
would contract for the right to sue a doctor.232
Proponents of a contract-based system of medical malpractice lia-
bility claim that the reform can come in two ways: patients can con-
tract individually with physicians, or patients could contract with their
health care provider.233 Generally, the patient would agree to waive
the right to sue for negligence, and the physician or insurance carrier
could offer that patient a lower price for health care.234 Courts have
previously disallowed waivers of medical malpractice liability by pa-
tients, declaring that they are against public policy.235 Additionally,
theorists recognize that "courts will block any deal between patients
and providers that exchanges lower-cost treatment for a waiver of the
patient's right to sue."236 Nonetheless, proponents still urge for a con-
tract based system, arguing that it would reduce medical malpractice
liability costs in a way that still benefits patients.237
One potential problem that could arise in this context is the impo-
sition of the traditional fiduciary duty that physicians owe to pa-
229. Id. at 507.
230. Id.
231. Id at 509.
232. Id. Epstein also theorizes as to how this new system might look in practice. He believes
that any new arrangements would involve a different standard of care, might restrict the use of
res ipsa loquitor, could involve expedited arbitration procedures, and might even place some caps
on damages. Id.
233. Arlen, supra note 224, at 960.
234. RICHARD A. THALER & CASs. R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 208-209 (2008).
235. Id. at 209.
236. Id. at 210.
237. Id. at 205-210. See also Duncan MacCourt & Joseph Bernstein, Medical Error Reduction
and Tort Reform Through Private, Contractually-Based Quality Medicine Societies, 35 AM. J.L. & MED.
505 (2009); Fixing Medical Malpractice Through Health Insurer Enterprise Liability, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1192, 1193 (2008) (discussing medical malpractice reform and insurer enterprise liability).
Other proposed alternatives to the current tort system for medical malpractice liability are a
legislatively created system of special "health courts" to handle claims, insurer enterprise liability,
and alternative dispute resolution.
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tient.238 Physicians generally have a duty to not take advantage of
patients, because the physicians have higher bargaining power.239 The
better informed provider, the doctor, has the duty to act in the pa-
tient's best interest.240 This duty already plays a large role in several
aspects of the patient-doctor relationship, including fiduciary disclo-
sure of risks and benefits of procedureS.241 With this understanding of
fiduciary duty, one can see where problems might arise in a situation
where a patient agrees to waive the right to sue for malpractice liabil-
ity. Courts will likely find that a physician who creates a contract with a
patient where the patient foregoes the right to sue for malpractice has
breached his fiduciary duty.242
Regardless of other potential issues that could arise with a re-
formed malpractice liability system, the idea may present a way for the
General Assembly to avoid the remittitur (and therefore separation of
powers) analysis. The contractual loophole to a statutory cap might
additionally be easier to implement than a complete state-imposed
alteration of the medical malpractice liability system (from tort to con-
tractual). One possible and important difference between the Innkeep-
er Protection Act and the methods discussed by proponents of reform,
however, is that the "special agreement" in the Act allows the hotel
proprietor to assume additional liability.243 The advocates of reform,
on the other hand, envision scenarios where the physician "gets out of"
liability.244 While this distinction may not matter in terms of a remit-
titur analysis, it would certainly raise concerns regarding patients'
bargaining power and might seem contrary to public policy.
CONCLUSION
In Lebron v. Gottlieb, the Illinois Supreme Court made a definitive
statement about statutory caps on noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice lawsuits. Any future attempts to limit noneconomic dam-
238. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients
and Health Care Providers, 51 U. Pm. L. REV. 365,366-367 (1990).
239. Id. at 390.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 391-393.
242. As Mehlman points out, at least one case has ruled that, as a matter of law, a patient can
waive the right to sue a provider for malpractice. See Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir.
1987) (court ruled that patient Schneider was barred from suing for malpractice liability because
she had waived the right to complain that the defendant physician used an unorthodox procedure
for her breast augmentation).
243. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/1.
244. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 234, at 208-209.
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ages in medical malpractice cases will meet a roadblock in the form of
a separation of powers challenge. The Lebron majority accurately dis-
tinguished between certain actions and caps, and complied with its
own precedent, when overturning Public Act 94-677. Lebron's reliance
on remittitur, despite receiving criticism, also signifies that the Illinois
Supreme Court will not address the constitutionality of the remittitur
doctrine in the future.
The Illinois Supreme Court has now made several important dis-
tinctions regarding the power of the General Assembly and the remit-
titur. When the General Assembly has created the right and the remedy
for a cause of action, it may limit the remedy for the cause of action
with a statutory cap.245 The General Assembly may also cap punitive
damage awards in any cause of action, because the plaintiff has no
vested right in punitive damages the same way a plaintiff has a right to
compensatory damages.246 Finally, the General Assembly may abolish
a cause of action, whether created by statute or derived from the com-
mon law, without implicating the remittitur doctrine.
The majority of the currently enacted statutes in Illinois which
limit common law liability will be relatively unaffected by the Lebron
decision. These statutes generally abolish causes of actions altogether,
rather than setting statutory caps,247 and will therefore be exempt
from the same separation of powers analysis. The only statute which
might receive future attention is the Innkeeper Protection Act, because
it does set a monetary limit for a damage award against a hotel248 The
potential "saving grace" for the Act remains in the fact that parties may
contract around the statutory limit.249 The idea of contracting around
or out of a statutory cap could represent a feasible solution for those
wishing to reform medical malpractice liability.
Proponents of such reform, which would allow individuals to con-
tract with either their physicians or their health care insurers, believe
that it would solve many of the economic problems that exist in the
current liability system.250 The system would transform into one con-
sisting of default rules, and patients who want to contract out of those
rules (and therefore contract for the right to sue a doctor) must take
245. See Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 912.
246. Id., quoting Smith, 147 N.E.2d at 326-327.
247. See supra notes 207-211.
248. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/1.
249. Id.
250. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 234, at 205-210.
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the initiative to do SO.251 Such a theory sounds simple enough, but re-
search shows that the rules of fiduciary duty might interfere with the
imposition of contract-based liability.252 Nonetheless, those frustrated
with the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Lebron may have discov-
ered a viable way to reform medical malpractice without implicating
the remittitur.
251. Id. at 208-209.
252. See Mehlman, supra note 238, at 366.
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